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The Case for Social and Economic Rights 
BY HAVI ECHENBERG AND BRUCE PORTER 
The Segregation of Social and Economic Rights 
ocial and economic rights are often distinguished from 
civil and political rights through a classical liberal 
dichotomy between a "positive" and "negative" obliga- 
tion placed on the state. Social and economic rights are 
held to oblige the state to "provide" health care, education or an 
adequate standard of living to those in need or at least, in western 
countries, to step in to perform a redistributive function, protect- 
ing those in need with the least possible interference with the 
marketplace. Civil and political rights, on the other hand, are held 
to impose a negative obligation on the state to refrain from 
unreasonably or arbitrarily infringing o n the individual's auton- 
omy, liberty and freedom of choice and to submit to democratic 
control. It is understood as legitimate for the judiciary to check 
the power of the state over the individual but it will exercise 
"judicial restraint" when it comes to policy matters regarding 
what and how the state is to provide for its citizens, these being 
viewed as political decisions properly made by an elected body. 
As a result, social and economic rights have been generally ex- 
empted from judicial consideration. Civil and political rights are 
thus viewed as inherent, universal and justifiable, while social 
and economic rights are viewed as 
evolving gradually in the political 
sphere, more a matter of social policy 
than of fundamental justice. 
Such distinctions, however, are 
generally misleading. Civil and po- 
litical rights, too, oblige the state to 
provide. The provision of a judiciary 
to protect criminal process rights, 
administrative tribunals, a democratic 
structure of representation and op- 
portunity for minority groups to "en- 
joy their own culture," to name a few 
of the state's responsibilities under 
the International Covenant on Civil 
and PoliticalRights, is surely as oner- 
ous as ensuring an adequate standard 
of living in a relatively affluent soci- 
ety. Indeed, the state is often more 
directly the ''provider" of criminal 
process and other civil rights through 
the judiciary than it is the provider of 
an adequate standard of living, which 
may be accomplished more through 
redistributive and regulatory activities than through the direct 
provision of goods and services. 
Moreover, the requirement of food, clothing, housing, educa- 
tion and medical care is surely no less universal or inherent to a 
life of freedom of choice and autonomy than the requisite civil 
and political rights. Safeguarding social and economic rights also 
requires putting a "check" on the power and tendency of the state 
to marginalize particular groups, and to limit the extent to which 
these groups share the collective wealth. 
The Disenfranchised Constituency 
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the classical dichotomy of 
rights, however, is the resulting exclusion of one class of rights 
claimants - the class that might claim economic and social 
rights. The claimant of civil and political rights remains, essen- 
tially, Locke's rational propertied individual who enters the 
social contract not out of need but out of choice and seeks by the 
entrenchment of rights to preserve autonomous choice from the 
power of the collectivity. Rights claims in this sphere are viewed 
as restorative, in the sense that they restore to the individual any 
property or individual freedom which may have been lost or in- 
fringed by abuse of collective power 
or through violations of one's per- 
sonal rights by other members of the 
collectivity. 
Claimants of social and economic 
rights, on the other hand, areproperty- 
less, in the full sense of the term. They 
have no claim to any particular prop- 
erty or individual freedom which has 
been lost through the infringement of 
a right. They participate in the social 
structure not through contractual 
choice but through need, which is to 
say that there is no "social contract" 
and they have no standing from which 
to establish any claim to rights as they 
are traditionally conceived within a 
civil structure. Thus the guarantee in 
the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights to freedom from 
interference with one's privacy and 
home is widely recognized and en- 
forced as a right but the right to be 
adequately housed in the first place, 
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guaranteed in the International Covenant 
on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 
is not. 
When poor people claim rights, the 
effects of this traditional conception of 
rights on modem practice become clear. 
Poor people approach the notion of hu- 
man rights and discrimination from the 
starting point of injustice, assuming quite 
naturally that homelessness or hunger is 
inflicted through the decisions or indeci- 
sion of others and establishes a human 
rights claim. They will energetically pres- 
ent to a human rights officer what they 
consider to be evidence of "discrimina- 
tion." describing an in- 
erty, describing rules of "fair play" within 
the very game that has already excluded 
them. To demand that a complaint evolv- 
ing from such a fundamental exclusion 
and deprivation as hunger, homelessness 
or poverty be framed in such terms is 
rather as if Justine Blainey had been re- 
quired to file her complaint of exclusion 
from boys' hockey as an infraction of the 
rules of the league that would not let her 
play. The reality of ahuman rights system 
which privileges civil and political rights 
at the expense of social and economic 
rights is that it is reduced to refereeing the 
major and minor infractions among those 
who, however tenuously, have made it 
terconnected and envel- into the league, but it is quite inca- 
Social Service Depart- 
ment and a Housing Authority on one side 
and on the other a sister, a friend who has 
the same landlord, various children and 
another single mother down the hall. They 
describe, in other words, a "system" that 
has inflicted injustice on a collection or 
"family" of people, making little distinc- 
tion between the public and private (house- 
hold) spheres. What poor people rarely 
describe as discrimination is a particular 
infringement of one person's right by an 
individual respondent causing a distinct 
loss that can be remedied. 
Human Rights Officers, even patient 
ones, will eventually be obliged to inter- 
rupt the description of this intricate and 
apparently endless web of "discrimina- 
tion" to explain that human rights legisla- 
tion prohibits only particular grounds of 
discrimination, that it is "restorative"only, 
and that only if a given right has been 
infringed is the complainant entitled to a 
"remedy." 
Potential claimants of social and eco- 
nomic rights are deflated by this imposed 
order of individuality, in which rights 
adhere to the singular person, almost as a 
piece of personal property protected from 
trespass. Prevalent human rights discourse 
is a thoroughly foreign language to poor 
people, who will readily identify it as a 
language of the "system," the unnamed 
respondent of their complaint, a language 
of the marketplace, the welfare office and 
the family courts, a language of contrac- 
tual relationships and individual prop- 
The State 'Trovider" 
Social and economic rights, even where 
they are recognized, are damaged if they 
are segregated from civil and political 
rights by a theoretical distinction basedon 
the role of the state. To promote the idea 
that the state 'provides" adequate health 
care, education, housing, clothing and food 
out of an enlightened respect for the social 
and economic rights of its neediest citi- 
zens risks obscuring the gender, class, 
race and power relations contained in 
such "provision." 
Significantly, all of the areas of entitle- 
ment in social and economic rights relate 
to activities that, in a pre-industrial econ- 
omy were situated within the household 
economy, where women at least occupied 
a relatively autonomous economic posi- 
tion, growing and gathering food, weav- 
ing textiles, educating children as co- 
workers, caring for the sick and main- 
taining the home. In the earliest days of 
urbanization and industrialization in 
Canada, it was women who recognized 
the value of meeting some of these needs 
in a collectivized and social way; they 
established Canada's first hospitals, 
schools, and libraries. It is only as these 
activities were removed from the home 
and from the voluntary sector, when they 
began to offer wages to the providers, and 
became part of the marketplace or the 
network of state-provided services, that 
they were placed under the control of 
male-dominated businesses and pro- 
fessions utilizing a devalued women's 
and children's labour, and subject to state 
regulation.' Social and economic rights 
simply abet this appropriation of women's 
work if they promote the state as provider 
rather than effecting atransfer ofpower to 
those whose work as providers has been 
devalued. The true providers of life's basic 
necessities - whether single mothers in 
their homes tending to their own needs 
and those of their children, women work- 
ing in the textile and food industries, or 
women working in services provided by 
the state that were previously performed 
by women in the home - are usually the 
very people who are themselves deprived 
of an adequate standard of living, in part 
by the removal of their functions from the 
home to the market place or the state. To 
relegate these people to the position of 
passive "recipients" of state provision or 
"beneficiaries" of minimum wage "pro- 
tection" only perpetuates the injustice by 
legitimating it. 
The notion of the state as provider often 
serves to conceal the controlling and regu- 
lating function of providers "for" those in 
need. State-run programs delivering 
goods, services and entitlements are often 
as marginalizing of those they are de- 
signed to assist as the private market that 
created the impoverishment in the first 
place. Public and non-profit housing, for 
example, may provide adequate housing 
to those whom the private market refuses 
to house, but at the same time it may serve 
to control where poor people live and 
bring with it new regulations and invasion 
of privacy and autonomy. A resident may 
be obliged to report to a property manager 
or committee (that might include neigh- 
bours) such personal information as that a 
man has moved in and is contributing to 
rent, that she has found a part-time job on 
the side but is not reporting it to Social 
Services or that a daughter has left home 
and no one knows if she will come back. 
The "social safety net" is a net which 
entraps as it catches. As French sociolo- 
gist Jean Jacques Depeyroux suggested, 
social services function as much to pro- 
tect society from the destitute as to protect 
the destitute themselves. "Thus it is some- 
times hard to distinguish between the 
orphanage and the correctional institu- 
tion,orbetween the shelterand theprison, 
that is to say between the measure of 
social protection and the penal ~anction."~ 
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Shelters and hostels regulate a lifestyle 
similar to that of prisons or other "protec- 
tive" institutions. There is a rigid sched- 
ule governing when you sleep, eat and go 
out. Medication and personal effects, of- 
ten including tampax, are administeredby 
staff. One shelter for young woman 
"runaways" and ex-prostitutes in Toronto 
has residents wear pajamas 24 hours a day 
to discourage them from leaving. The 
distinction between civil rights and social 
and economic rights is thus largely irrele- 
vant to poor people, who can be in- 
carcerated and institutionalized by pov- 
erty rather than by an infringement of civil 
rights. 
Poor people cannot begin to meet their 
basic needs unless the deprivation of 
fundamental freedom and choice that often 
results from the provision of services by 
the state is challenged. Poverty is de- 
scribed by poor people as an absence of 
choice, dignity and autonomy as often as 
it is described as material need. Admini- 
stering to needs, however, is what "help- 
ing" professions are all about; as what 
poor people call the "poverty industry" 
continues to anoint its own professional 
class of social service workers, housing 
providers, health care providers and liter- 
acy experts, it becomes increasingly tempt- 
ing for a growing number of us to define 
poor people not as they define themselves, 
but rather by the needs to which we ad- 
minister. Instead of challenging this dis- 
enfranchisement of poor people, the 
human rights movement has promoted it 
by polarizing the issues of material need 
and freedom of choice, overemphasizing 
the distinction between economic rights 
and civil rights. 
The Claiming of Rights in a 
Different Voice 
The challenge, then, is not to recognize 
social and economic rights as they have 
been traditionally defined and segregated, 
but rather to enable their claimants to 
redefine these rights so that they are in- 
corporated into the work of the human 
rights movement, in such a way as to give 
full voice to a previously excluded con- 
stituency. That voice may very well be "a 
different voice," as Carol Gilligan de- 
scribes women's articulation of rights, 
finding among the women in her study an 
emphasis on the complex "web of hu- 
man relationships as opposed to the indi- 
viduation and autonomy emphasized by lacking literacy skills and personal re- 
the men, a recognition of the importance sources. The system has an individualis- 
of care and responsibility entailed in rights tic basis that is isolating at best and fre- 
rather than the idea of fairness in the rules quently quite abusive of poor people. The 
of a competitive game.3 Others have sug- value of reclaiming the complaint process 
gested that what Gilligan finds in women is great enough, however, to warrant 
may be characteristic of the voice of sup- making every effort to overcome the bar- 
pressed and powerless groups in generaL4 riers imposed by the current processes. A 
Certainly claimants of social and eco- human rights complaint can be a politiciz- 
nomic rights will be served only by a po- ing and collectivizing document rather 
liticized human rights advocacy which in than a bureaucratic and legalistic appro- 
turn serves political struggles in what priation of rights which, even in the clas- 
Elizabeth Schneider describes as a "dia- sical notion of rights, belong to the claim- 
lectic of rights and  politic^."^ The point is ant. There is a powerful narrative move- 
not to have human rights lawyers take ment in a human rights complaint, start- 
overpoorpeoples' movemerRsorto impart ing with a personal story of discrimina- 
more authority to the courts in social and tion which can be documented in acces- 
political matters but to develop routes of sible language, in the words of the rights 
access to any sources of power and legiti- claimants themselves, and culminating 
mation that will enable poor people to be with the claiming of equality rights be- 
heard, and to meet their own needs. longing to all the members of the group to 
One organization which has articulated which the claimant belongs. 
this approach, the Ottawa Council for A single mother on social assistance 
Low-Income Support Services, afew years forced to live with her parents because 
ago produced a button which read: landlords insist on deciding for her that 
"POVERTY STOPS EQUALITY. she can not afford to rent an apartment on 
EQUALITY STOPS POVERTY." Their her own, or a battered woman living in a 
words point the way to a reintegrated shelter with her children who has been 
approach to social and economic rights trying for weeks to find a landlord who 
within human rights advocacy and to an will rent to someone without an estab- 
appropriate "dialectic of lished credit rating, is affirmed and 
rights and politics." The politicized by signing and 
goal, of course, is to elimi- 
-'r submitting a document nate poverty, but ap- that describes in her proaching poverty from ownwords how sheand the starting point of equal- her children have been 
ity rights thwarts the pre- denied access to ade- 
vailing, more comfortable discourse that quate accommodation. When the com- 
defines poverty as a condition to be reme- plaint cites her belief that her rights as a 
died or treated. As Miller andRoby wrote woman and as a single mother to equal 
in The Future of Inequality in 1970, treatmentwithoutdiscriminationbecause 
"Poverty has become the acceptable way of her sex, marital status or family status 
of discussing the more disturbing issue of have been infringed, she may be artic- 
ineq~ality."~ Understanding poverty as ulating for the first time in a public man- 
inequality repoliticizes it, taking the ner her very private burden of homeless- 
remedy outof the hands of theadminister- ness. When the complaint cites the ad- 
ing professionals and returning it to the verse effect of rental policies on women 
hands of the victims of the injustice. Are- and single mothers, it lists common char- 
politicized approach such as this con- acteristics she shares with other women 
fronts human rights jurisprudence with and single mothers. Thus, in filing her 
the deprivations of poverty and economic claim, she challenges her isolation and 
inequality as issues of fundamental injus- affirms her membership in a collectivity 
tice, as discrimination - precisely as made up of others who are similarly op- 
poorpeoplehavealwaysunderstoodthem. pressed. Frequently, the claimant's copy 
Human rights claims, of course, are of the complaint will be passed around a 
themselves administered within a profes- shelter or shared among neighbours or in- 
sionalized and appropriating bureaucratic formal "family" members who will some- 
structure, with intake procedures that are times decide to file similar complaints. A 
almost entirely inaccessible to anyone network of support emerges and there are 
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friends and family to accompany her to 
hearings as she stakes a claim in a public 
domain that has in the past largely ex- 
cluded her, The human rights system will 
insist on calling hera "complainan t" whose 
rights are alleged to have been "infringed," 
but she and her supporters know that she 
is a "claimant" of rights she's never had. 
Assessing Canada's Compliance 
There is, of course, no universal measure 
which can be applied equally to Canada 
and to developing countries of an ade- 
quate standard of living or adequate food, 
clothing and housing. There is ample 
recognition, both in the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cul- 
tural Rights, and in the general approach 
of the United Nations committee moni- 
toring state compliance, of dramatic dif- 
ferences in levels of resources available to 
various countries. The notion that states 
should be granted a "margin of apprecia- 
tion" allowing for diverse cultural and 
economic circumstances has been well 
accepted in international cases in civil and 
political rights and this willbe fundamental 
in the developing approaches to social 
and economic rights as well. No one 
expects the same of a country with wide- 
spread famine and sixty per cent of the 
population homeless as of Canada. Here 
we haveenough food toexport andenough 
existing housing to house everyone who 
is alive and who will be born until the end 
of this century, yet we 
failure to achieve "progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in 
the... International Covenant" "to the 
maximum of [our] available re~ources."~ 
For a government of so wealthy a country 
to renege on its binding intemational 
commitment to honour "the fundamental 
right of everyone to be free from hunger," 
particularly when this problem could be 
solved so much more easily here than in 
other countries, is a national disgrace. In 
the area of housing as well, the conspicu- 
ous failure to guarantee access to ade- 
quate housing, especially for mothers and 
their children, to Native people, disabled 
people and o$ergroups facing widespread 
discrimination, results in part from legis- 
lative and regulatory inaction by the 
government that is quite remarkable by 
international standards. 
In Canada. 96 per cent of housing is 
provided by the private sector, so that 
ensuring equitable distribution necessar- 
ily involves regulating how the private 
sector allocates units. That job has fallen 
primarily on the provinces, which have 
the responsibility of ensuring, predomi- 
nantly through humanrights legislation, a 
non-discriminatory allocation of housing. 
Yet the provinces have failed to stop 
widespread discriminatory practices that 
are unheard of in most parts of the world. 
The majority of provinces still allow re- 
strictions preventing families with chil- 
dren from acquiring accommodation, 
despite the strong protections for mothers 
and families with children in in- 
- - 
have seen growing ternational human rights 
numbers of foodbanks law.a Only Quebec, 
supplying food to an in- where discrimination on 
creasing number of the ground of "social 
hungry people and condition" is prohibited, 
- -  - - 
emergency shelters and 
hostels becoming overcrowded as soon as 
they are opened. The exclusion of certain 
groups from a prosperous economy is as 
much the issue as their level of need. 
Social and economic rights are insepa- 
rable from equality rights in that compli- 
ance can be judged only in terms of an 
obligation to ensure a reasonably equitable 
distribution of available resources and 
not in terms of some international mini- 
mum standard of provision. 
The increasing number of homeless and 
hungry people in the midst of economic 
prosperity in Canada are living witness to 
the serious violation of social and eco- 
nomic rights, since they demonstrate our 
has legislated any protec- 
tion from discrimination on the basis of 
level of income. People are routinely 
denied access to adequate housing in 
Canada simply because they have a lower 
income, no credit rating or would be shar- 
ing accommodation with others. We have 
accepted a housing delivery system that 
excludes families and poor people for no 
other reason than that landlords consider 
them "undesirable tenants," a system 
which forces over 100,000 people a year 
to sleep in hostels, bus shelters or in parks 
while there are 32 unused bedrooms for 
each one of them in underutilized existing 
housing stock, often held for investment 
purposes. This would be totally unaccept- 
able in most other countries in the world, 
yet here we remain relatively complacent 
about it. 
Claiming Place 
One of the more important roles of 
social and economic rights is to disrupt 
complacency about forms of exclusion 
and marginalization that gain acceptance 
simply by virtue of their familiarity. 
Advocacy must work with existing legis- 
lation, but the existing framework must 
be challenged at the same time, by asking 
the questions the system tries to silence. A 
homeless family refused housingby every 
landlord in town because of their low 
income will ask: "So where are we sup- 
posed to live?" Claiming social and eco- 
nomic rights gives voice to that question 
at a hearing, challenging a more compla- 
cent approach to assessing whether a 
policy is "reasonable and bona fide in the 
circumstances." 
Recently, some poor people in Canada 
have been seeking remedies to inadequate 
standards of living by challenging dis- 
crimination within social assistance and 
other income transfer programs. A single 
father seeks the same benefits from Unem- 
ployment Insurance as a single mother 
would receive to provide at-home care to 
a newborn; a young single employable 
man in British Columbia seeks the same 
social assistance rate as someone older; a 
singledisabled man in Saskatchewan seeks 
the same benefit level as a disabled indi- 
vidual living within a couple: each has 
turned to the equality provisions of hu- 
man rights codes and the Charter, citing 
sex, age and marital status discrimination 
to make his case. In each case, he has been 
successful through the courts. It is not 
surprising, of course, that all of the plain- 
tiffs were male. Equality rights are rarely 
themselves equally accessible to all. 
Nevertheless, equality rights approaches 
such as these, to which we are often lim- 
ited by articulated and specific prohibited 
grounds in human rights legislation, have 
an implicit social and economic rights 
aspect. They take the economic rights 
accorded to one group and extend them to 
others, using equality rights to attempt to 
universalize social and economic rights 
which are not themselves written into the 
Charter. 
Claimants of social and economic rights 
must begin to constitute a movement, 
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both national and international, that in- 
corporates political, social and judicial 
activity. The idea of movement is built 
into the legal definition of such rights as 
being "progressively realized." The legal 
rights are validated only as they are sus- 
tained by a social and political movement 
that articulates their meaning and enforces 
them through public consensus. Because 
no higher authority will step in and force 
us to eliminate poverty, hunger and home- 
lessness in Canada, these 
entering the voting place that had been 
declared the property of men, or black 
people marching together or sometimes 
walking alone into places that were re- 
stricted to whites only. Social and m- 
nomic rights are relatively recent in law 
but there is really nothing so new about 
them. They have a similar constituency 
advancing a not unfamiliar claim - but 
they are being claimed in a vital and 
different voice. 
rights are legally binding l Provincial regulation of the 
by good faith only. There use of women's and 
are no police or courts to children's labour was 
enforce them unilaterally. first legislated in Can- 
A movement, of ada at the beginning of 
course, is based in its con- the century. Although 
stituents; the constituency 
of social and economic rights consists of 
those who have been excluded from the 
enjoyment of any meaningful participa- 
tion in the community's social, economic 
and cultural life. The movement is aclaim- 
ing of place by those groups and peoples. 
Thus, social and economic rights rest in a 
concept of place, not in a notion of prop- 
erty. Having arightfulplaceinone'scom- 
munity requires a sense of belonging, of 
being a f f i e d  by the community in an 
inclusive way. Property, on theother hand, 
has to do with the ability to keep other 
people out. When rights are articulated in 
terms of property, they become exclusive 
rather than inclusive in both their ap- 
plication and their effect. 
Rights should have as their starting 
point aclaiming of place within acommu- 
nity, and it is the essence of human rights 
to oppose the tendency to exclude. But the 
claiming of place can be distorted. When 
it is translated into the language of a legal 
system which privileges exclusion over 
inclusion, property over place, rights are 
articulated as their opposite, tied to higher 
authority rather than social movements, 
and protecting property from encroach- 
ment rather thanmarginalizedpeopk from 
exclusion. A claiming of place by ex- 
cluded constituencies brings rights back 
to where they belong. 
The social and economic rights move- 
ment, now in its nascency, may appear in 
a few years - in retrospect - to be 
reminiscent of earlier political and civil 
rights movements. Those movements 
crystallized when rights merged with 
social and political movements, when 
segregation was challenged by women 
the aim was to protect 
women and children from economic ex- 
ploitation, "we should not overlook the 
fact that such legislation did recognize 
child labour and sanctioned the inferiority 
of women's labour." See R. Bureau, K. 
Lippel and L. Lamarche, "Development 
and Trends in Canadian Social Law, 1940 
to 1984" in Family Law and Social Wel- 
fare Legislation in Canada, ed. Ivan 
Bernier and An&& Lajoie (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1986). p. 77. 
2Quoted and translated in R. Bureau, K. 
Lippel and L. Lamarche, op.cit., p. 121. 
Brenda Doyle Farge, a feminist Canadian 
sociologist who interviewed staff and 
homeless women in hostels and shelters, 
confirms this view in "Hostels for Single 
Women: Subjectivity, Discourse, and 
Social Regulation" (Ph.D thesis, Depart- 
ment of Education,University of Toronto, 
1988). 
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women's De- 
velopment (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- 
sity Press, 1982). 
For an excellent discussion of the im- 
plication of Gilligan's analysis in rights 
advocacy see Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
"The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: 
Perspectives from the Women's 
Movement," New York University Law 
Review Vol. 61, No. 589 (1986). 
"Elizabeth Schneider provides a useful 
summary of the responses to and elabora- 
tion of Gilligan's work in "Dialectics of 
Rights andPolitics," op.cit., pp. 616-617. 
Schneider, pp. 616-617. 
S.M. Miller and P.A. Roby, The future 
of Inequality (New York: Basic Books, 
1970), p. 3, quoted in Hil& Scott, Work- 
ing Your Way to the Bottom: The Femini- 
zation of Poverty (London: FandoraPress, 
1984), p, 11. 
'International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Article2 (1). 
Article 10 of the International Cove- 
nant on Economic. Social and Cultural 
Rights states that. 
The States Parties to the present Cove- 
nant recognize that: 
1 .  The widest possible protection and 
assistance should be accorded to the 
family, which is the natural andfunda- 
mental group unit of society, partic- 
ularly for its establishment and while it 
is responsible for the care and educa- 
tion of dependent children. 
Havi Echenberg is the Executive Direc- 
tor of the National Anti-Poverty Organi- 
zation. Bruce Porter is the Coordinator 
for the Centre for Equality Rights in Ac- 
commodation. 
I 1  
Women's Studies 
& Social Science 1 1  Appointment 
Applications are invited for an Assistant 
Professor in the tenure stream beginning 
July 1,1991. Women's Studies and Social 
Sciences. 
Capable of teaching in large undergradu- 
ate classes as well as senior seminars. 
Teaching duties in Women's Studies will 
indude courses in Third World Women 
and Womenof Colour, andscientific Per- 
spectives in Sex and Gender. 
Thisadvertisement isdirected towards 
Social Sdentists with expertise in Political 
Science, Economics, or Sociology. Out- 
standingcandidates with other social sci- 
ence specializations may also be consid- 
ered. 
Applicants must have a Ph.D. at the 
time of appointment and a strong schol- 
arly record. Applications (including C.V. 
and three letters of reference) should be 
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Kay Armatage, Director 
Women's Studies Programme 
New College 
University of Toronto 
Toronto, ON MSS IAl 
by 15 December 1990. 
In accordance with Canadian Immi- 
gration requirements, this advertisement 
is directed to Canadian citizens and per- 
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